Egypt’s parliamentary elections will stir social tensions and political confrontations. But this is a normal aspect of a democratic process, and a successful election is a must to buttress the strategic change that Egypt’s January 25 Revolution has set off. The new parliament and government will have to put forward credible and detailed outlooks concerning five momentous strategic considerations.

1. A clear political process with a set time frame that achieves buy-in from Egypt’s major sociopolitical players
Tunisia managed to carry out smooth Constituent Assembly elections; but the country’s real achievement was that all political players have accepted a comprehensive and detailed process that would over time yield a constitution, parliament and president. The rules of the game were set — the winners abided, the losers consented and crucially, Tunisians understood them.

In the absence of acceptable rules and an agreed process, the current political ambiguity in Egypt could invite trouble. Excessive fluidity could lead to violence and turmoil. The new Egyptian parliament and government would have the legitimacy — the people’s clear mandate — to espouse a comprehensive plan.

The current dynamism augurs well: all serious political entities in Egypt recognize that the society is rich with varied ideologies and visions.

Even if a single political current emerges with a slight majority, its leaders should appreciate the necessity of working with the different political minorities to present a detailed road map in which all significant constituents agree.

2. Egypt’s short-term economic outlook is dire
The four macro pillars of Egypt’s economy are suffering: tourism, remittances, foreign direct investment and internal trading. Monetary policy is shouldering the burden of compensating for these shortfalls, but that is unsustainable.

Egypt lost almost a third of its net international reserves in less than 10 months, and foreign debt holders increasingly shed their exposure to Egyptian bonds. Capital markets’ liquidity is at all times low and valuations indicate that investors price in very negative scenarios. This is telling in a market in which more than 70% of the participants are local. The weakening of the state’s economic regulatory system since the revolution and the deterioration in the overall security situation, put upward pressures on inflation. A very significant percentage of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the country suffer from a serious — and worsening — cash flow problem. This has wide spillover effects in a market in which the gray economy employs more than 40% of all of the country’s labour force. SMEs’ suffering is exacerbated by the government’s increasing reliance on internal borrowing (from local banks), which crowds out the private sector.

There are no panaceas. Escapism will not work. And buying off some of the large social segments, such as public sector employees, is practically not an option; the resources are not there. Because of the legitimacy bestowed on them, members of parliament should have the courage to present Egyptians with the country’s true balance sheet: its assets, liabilities and net worth. The picture might come across as grim.

But after the revolution, most Egyptians have regained their sense of ownership of their country. It is the time that the country’s legitimate representatives ask their people for sacrifices. The parliament, government and later, the presidency, should start with themselves, abolishing the immense waste inherent in these institutions’ machinations. This should not be a Churchillian “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil and tears” moment; rather, the parliament and government should highlight Egypt’s immense underdeveloped assets and resources, the country’s solid institutional infrastructure, and the dramatic potential inherent in more than 45 million people under 30. But for that potential to be realized, severe imbalances need to be addressed.

3. Egypt must forge a new social contract and national narrative
Over the past 40 years, the fundamental tenets of Egypt’s 1952 revolution — and chief amongst them “social equality” and “citizens’ dignity” — were slowly but steadily discarded. Ordinary Egyptians’ relationship with the regime wore off and crucially the foundations upon which the first Egyptian republic was built waned. The new parliament and government should clearly propose a new set of “citizens’ rights and obligations” and the basis for the people’s relationship with the state. The difficult part would be doing that at a time when significant segments of society undergo economic pains and without abandoning the free market mind-set that all developed economies have embraced. This is a considerable challenge; it will require fluent rhetoric, genuine leadership, management by example and maintaining a balance between short-term obligations and long-term objectives.

But we have been here before. In the period from 1967 to 1973, Egypt rebuilt its armed forces after a humiliating defeat, sustained its industrial expansion programme, cleverly managed inflation, and underwent major political changes. As the renowned poet Nizar Kabbani put it, “the flower of will emerges from the soil of pain.”

Fashioning a serious national narrative means recognizing that over the past 40 years, Egyptianism was diluted; sectarianism (Islamism and Christianism) took center stage. Egyptian society’s frame of reference underwent major variations. Today, there is a serious concern amongst many Coptic Christians that Egyptian inclusiveness is fading and will undergo a historic weakening over the coming few years. Such sectarianism is not only perilous to the society’s modus vivendi; it also defies Egypt’s historical experience and identity. The sociopolitical Islamic forces in the next parliament, more than any other political player, must assuage these fears and find a working formula between the sacred and secular.

4. Egypt’s strategic positioning in the region
Egyptian strategists and historians have ensconced Egypt’s special place in the region within the national psyche. Taha Hussein and Tawfiq Al-Hakim marked out Egypt as the bridge between Europe and the East and emphasized the country’s missionary role in the Arab world.

Ahmed Shawki, the country’s leading poet, hailed Egypt as the crown of the East, and paved the way for the Orientalist school of thought that saw Egypt’s future in an increasingly prominent role in the Levant, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. The Arab nationalists progressed that line of thought and developed it into a comprehensive regional sociopolitical project. Gamal Hemdan, Egypt’s most famous geography professor, delved into the historical, geographic and identity ‘imperatives that dictated’ Egypt’s role in the region. For millions of Egyptians, Egypt’s role in the Arab world was the country’s sole route not only to retaining significance, but also to defining itself.

For the past 35 years, Egypt was absent — and that must change. But resources are limited, the Arab world today is different from the way it was in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Middle East is currently undergoing strategic changes. The new government will have to reach out to the country’s key sociopolitical constituents before putting forward a national security strategy through which Egypt would navigate a very fluid Middle East — one which will witness serious confrontations in the medium term. In re-engaging with its Arab milieu, Egypt needs to rediscover the heritage of its international relations, study the experience of its regional positioning in the past century, and situate these with the realities of the existing (and emerging) geostrategic landscape in its neighborhood. Developing a working and realistic foreign policy narrative will be another major and inescapable challenge.

5. Engaging young Egyptians
As mentioned above, a society with 45 million people under 30 entails spectacular potential. But, in turbulent sociopolitical conditions and painful economic circumstances, this young force could become perilous. Young Egyptians have been saddled with a heritage of political and socioeconomic failures that they did not contribute to, and yet are living with the consequences — in severe economic conditions and a dismal future. At its core, the January 25 Revolution represented the emergence of a moment of promise. If the society loses the hope that the revolution gave rise to, these young millions will lose their patience. And in such depressing milieu, we could see massive waves of emigration, internal turmoil, and potentially widespread violence.

The new parliament and government should refrain from the classic top-down imposition of policies, strategies and rules that have characterized the first Egyptian republic in its 60 years. There is much in Egyptian history and traditions that predisposed Egyptians to expect and accept imposition of power. No longer. The exponential increase in Egyptian demographics over the past 30 years imbued Egyptian society with an unstoppable, mighty bottom-up force — its youth. Genuine open dialogue with the youth — in universities, labor organizations and civic society gatherings, across the country and at different socioeconomic strata (not only in Cairo and Alexandria, and not only with the politically active, media-savvy groups) — is paramount.

The January 25 Revolution succeeded because it affixed itself to hopes and aspirations (political as well as economic) for which tens of millions of the country’s massive middle classes aspire. It would be a huge waste of potential if the legitimate representatives of the people fail to cling to these hopes and strive for these aspirations.